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Summary: The globally widespread economic crisis that burst in 2007 has been a central topic 
of recent papers. Economists and researchers have been pointing out that the crisis underpins 
the downfall of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), as part of a search for the roots of the 
crisis. This undermined the belief in the traditional asset-pricing theories and models. Several 
papers have surfaced that highlight the role of the EMH in the economic crisis, and have 
therefore doomed the theory governing market mechanism as dead. This paper presents the 
current debate and takes the side of proponents of the EMH who argue that  that this assertion 
is flawed, and the EMH remains the most appropriate proxy for understanding market forces. 
It is the only quantifiable approach to model market prices that is still in use by analysts and 
investors today. 
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1 Introduction 
How financial engineers could gain so much ground, and eventually credibility that 
lead to the widespread growth of their activity. Prior to the recent credit crisis, the 
derivatives market was trading at volumes exceeding spot markets of the underlying 
products.  To  grasp  the  risks  incurred  through  these  sophisticated,  multi-tranched 
derivatives was beyond the understanding of risk managers. How did the crisis evolve 
is still a question that is unsettled amongst researchers. For this, I could imagine that a 
sociological approach would give great insight as to what sociological factors were 
motivating market participants. This would help understand the complex network of 
motives and actions. The role of the credit rating agencies remains also an ethical and 
professional issue. How come assets so toxic as they turned out to be, were AAA 
rated. Conflict of interest was surely to play a part.  
2 Financial innovation 
When  markets  are  efficient,  they  work  smoothly  whereby  the  possession  of  new 
information  causes  no  added-value.   From  this  stems  the  assumption  in  financial 
models that additional information should come at no cost, as it is already reflected in 
prices.  It is  much ore likely to have transparent pricing  for financial instruments 140
traded on stock markets e.g. stocks, bonds, commodities.  But the matter of fact is that 
the efficient  market  hypothesis fails in practice.  Investments traded on the stock 
market  by  far  do  not  represent  to  complete  investment  portfolio  available  to 
investors.   Other  financial  products  are  available  on  different  platforms,  most  of 
which  are  less  transparent  than  stock  markets.   The  efficient  market  hypothesis 
(EMH), however, makes assumptions that limit its validity to a theoretical market.  
Amongst  these  assumptions  is  that  all  transactions  are  transparent,  which  makes 
pricing fair (unbiased), as they incorporate all available information including the 
expectations  of  the  market  participants  of  the  future  shaping  of  the  market.  
Information,  as  defined  by  the  theory,  is  anything  that  affects  prices  in  a  way 
unknown in the present appearing randomly in the future.  For this reason, it is not 
possible  to  consistently  outperform  the  market  by  taking  advantage  of  news  the 
market already knows, except when an investor is lucky. 
3 Background to EMH 
The  efficient  market  hypothesis  was  first  coined  by  Louis  Bachelier,  a  French 
mathematician. In his 1900 dissertation “Théorie de la Spéculation” he “begins the 
mathematical modelling of stock price movements and formulates the principle that 
‘the  expectation  of  the  speculator  is  zero.’  Obviously,  he  understands  here  by 
expectation the conditional expectation given the past information.  In other words, he 
implicitly accepts as an axiom that the market evaluates assets using a martingale 
measure.” (Courtault et al. 2000 p. 343)  Yet his work was overlooked for decades 
until the mid 1960s when Paul Samuelson stumbled upon the dissertation and soon it 
became a hot topic for financial economists.  However, the efficient market theory 
owes  its  refined  details  to  Professor  Eugene  Fama  of  the  University  of  Chicago 
Graduate School of Business.  Fama started the formation of the theory as a PhD. 
dissertation and ended up as a life-long research.  In 1970 he published a review of 
both the theory and the evidence for the hypothesis. The paper extended and fine-
tuned the theory; in addition, it included the definitions for three forms of market 
efficiency: the weak, the semi-strong and the strong form of market efficiency. 
The theory assumes that market participants apart from being utility maximising, also 
have rational expectations.  This includes the assumption that even though individuals 
may be  wrong, the population as a  whole  is correct; and that people adjust their 
expectations according to new information. When faced with new information, some 
investors will overreact and others will under react.  In summery, reactions will be 
random, but will have a constant volatility, and a known distribution function. Thus, 
the  net  effect  does  not  allow  for  abnormal  profit  to  be  realised  especially  when 
considering transaction costs and spreads. 
Fama says that an efficient market is one that quickly adjusts to new information.  It 
prevails in markets where prices “fully reflect” available data. This constitutes the 
impossibility  of  attainting  extra  profits  by  trading  on  the  basis  of  knowledge  of 
information already incorporated.   141
It means that in its strongest form, there should be no cost of information. We know 
that this in untrue, and that a whole industry is based on selling information. This is 
why the need arises to further define efficiency of the markets. This has taken the 
form 3 levels of information integration; the weak form of efficiency, the semi-strong 
form of efficiency and the strong form of efficiency are discussed below.  
3.1 Weak form of efficiency 
In its weakest form, the efficient market hypothesis assumes that all historical share 
prices are already incorporated into the pricing of assets. Therefore, no excess profits 
can  be  earned  by  basing  investment  strategies  on  past  returns.  This  implies  that 
technical analysis, which studies formations in past returns, is useless in predicting 
the  future.  Since  past  performance  is  already  known  to  the  market,  the  current 
situation remains unknown. This is where fundamental analysis gains attention and 
may be rewarding for those keen investors who do their homework on companies’ 
financial statements.   
Tests  for  the  weak  form  of  efficiency  engage  in  historical  data  analysis  using 
statistical  and  econometrical  methods.  Analyses  concerning  market  value,  P/E, 
DIV/P, and book-equity-to-market-equity influences on past data, as well as technical 
analysis are prevalent in such testing. 
3.2 Semi-strong form of efficiency 
The levels of efficiency gradually increase their restrictions, so it is natural for the 
next level to include the previously stated assumptions. In addition to historical data, 
the semi-strong form of efficiency incorporates publicly available new information 
rapidly into pricing; this insinuates that fundamental analysis will yield nothing. 
Testing for semi-strong form of efficiency is similar to event studies. Emergence of 
new information usually takes the form of quarterly or annual reports or events such 
as mergers, acquisitions, purchase of treasury shares, new issuances or splits. The 
emergence of such news should induce markets to adapt quickly.  We can measure 
the quickness and flow of the adaptation to new information. 
3.3 Strong form of efficiency 
This level of efficiency constitutes the incorporation of all existing information, both 
public and private, into prices.  In such a model no one can earn extra profits.  Of 
course  in  reality  laws  prohibit  trading  using  insider  information.    The  Hungarian 
Capital Market Law (Tpt CXX/2001 § 199-205) prohibits trade using information not 
known to the public.  In the United States the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 
and  the  Insider  Trading  and  Securities  Fraud  Enforcement  Act  of  1988  regulates 
penalties for illegal insider trading “to be as high as three times the profit gained or 
the loss avoided from the illegal trading.” 
1  Relevant laws in the United Kingdom 
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also reveal a similar standpoint. The Financial Services Act 1986 and the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 define an offence of Market Abuse.   
Testing the strong form is a test for the existence of insider trading.  We attempt to 
reveal the investment activity of interest groups with monopoly over key decisions in 
the  companies.    This  can  be  observed  in  price  adjustments  taking  place  before 
important announcements are made public. 
4 A new framework 
The recent credit crisis set a new framework for the theory for efficient markets. What 
we acknowledge about market mechanisms is that reacting to new information are 
what determine the informational efficiency of that particular market. The promptness 
of  share  prices  in  reflecting  additional  information  before  it  is  exploited  by 
arbitrageurs  is  what  makes  a  market  efficient.  Rather,  this  process  ought  to  be 
instantaneous. If not so, this deficiency will lead to mispriced shares that are a source 
of abnormal profits. 
The degree of efficiency describes the extent of information prices reflect. Taking the 
thought  of  market  efficiency  a  step  further,  the  only  way  for  a  market  to  be 
completely efficient is by allowing time for investors to react to new knowledge, thus 
new transactions will shift prices accordingly. This mechanism will, in turn, ensure 
sustaining  market  efficiency.    Yet  there  are  always  ‘early-birds’  whose  trading 
initiates price correction, and they are the ones who will make extra profits.   
Does  this  mean  that  it  is  inevitable  for  market  movers  to  make  abnormal  (risk-
adjusted) profits, as the market functions this way? This premium is the payment for 
the so-called ‘early-birds’ for researching and looking out for such opportunities. 
How  can  data-mining  be  this  rewarding  when  market  transparency  and  speed  of 
information is facilitated by modern telecommunication? In reality, these abnormal 
profits  exceed  any  justified  premium.  While  the  EMH  lacks  a  sound  alternative 
theory, a replacing supposition would include explanations of long-term market over-
reaction  and  under-reaction  to  events  as  explanations  to  the  causes  of  market 
anomalies. On the other hand, chances of over-reaction are about as likely to occur as 
chances of under-reaction; this is, in turn, consistent with efficient market hypothesis. 
Set-backs to this theory are numerous. Researchers argue about the validity of the 
efficient market hypothesis in the real markets, especially its strong form. The main 
set-back to the theory includes slow transmission of information, and relative power 
of a few market players.  The market’s mechanism in adapting to change in interest 
rates for instance, takes from a few hours to several weeks.  This is the main defect, 
whereas according to the EMH this process ought to be instantaneous. Only a few 
privileged people may have prior knowledge of new laws or decisions that will affect 
prices. As  long as actors on ‘inside information’ arbitrate  market  mispricing in a 
discreet manner, they can avoid being detected.  As soon as such trading takes place 
on a wide scale, we cannot dismiss it from our study as random variables.   143
Another malefficiency of the real markets compared to the ideal suggested by EMH is 
that at extreme situations what fundamentalists consider irrational investor behaviour 
is actually the norm. As an instance, the last stage of a bull market is usually driven 
by buyers (speculators) who take little consideration of the underlying value of the 
asset. Contrarily, the end of a bear market witnesses a free fall as everybody attempts 
to close their positions regardless of the quality of the investments they hold. This 
observation  is  bolstered  by  the  differences  in  stock  valuation  in  bull  markets 
compared to bear markets. Thus, it would make sense for rational investors to take 
advantage  of  the  feigned  high  or  low  prices  caused  by  irrational  participants,  by 
taking  on  opposite  positions.  Obviously  in  practice  this  is  insufficient  to  prevent 
arising bubbles or crashes. Rational investors are aware of the irrational behaviour of 
the market, and at extreme times, they will need reasons superseding fundamental 
explanations to convince them that the market will return towards fair value. It was 
shown  statistically,  that  extreme  values  do  occur  more  often  than  a  normal 
distribution would anticipate. These extreme values are not confined to three sigmas; 
a phenomenon financial literature refers to as a distribution’s fat tail. 
Opponents of the theory argue that there exists a small  number of investors  who 
managed to sustain their outperformance of the market for long periods of time, in a 
way that overrules the role of luck. These include names such as Peter Lynch and 
Warren Buffett. Their strategies were always to identify markets where prices did not 
fully reflect available information. On the other hand, proponents of the theory argue 
that EMH does not rule out the success of a limited number of funds through chance. 
Furthermore, these explanations go on to explain the success of ‘star’ fund managers 
as being the result of management skills rather than stock market prediction. 
Malkiel  is  a  famous  supporter  of  the  general  validity  of  the  efficient  market 
hypothesis.    Even  he,  based  on  empirical  findings,  believes  that  some  emerging 
markets for example the Chinese markets, are not efficient. Malkiel warns that “the 
Shanghai and Shenzen markets exhibit substantial serial correlation in price trends 
and evidence of manipulation, contrarily to the random walk theory that is expected 
from markets in the United States.” Malkiel (2003) 
Moreover,  the  efficient  market  hypothesis  appears  to  be  inconsistent  with  some 
events in stock market history even in the United States.  The market crash of 1987 
was caused by no major news; and despite that the Monday of the crash saw the S&P 
500 index fall more than 20% only in the month of October.  The decline seemed to 
originate  from  nowhere,  only  the  irrational  behaviour  that  caused  the  haphazard 
sweep through stock markets, Malkiel continues. 
Investment  culture  in  the  public’s  imagination  also  refuses  the  efficient  market 
hypothesis.    This  may  be  attributed  to  a  general  misconception  concerning  its 
meaning.  Many believe that EMH states that a security’s price is a correct reflection 
of  the  value  of  the  underlying  company  as  calculated  by  discounting  the  future 
returns.  If this were true, it would mean that a stock’s price accurately envisages 
future results.  Since this is evidently not the case, many people reject the hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, EMH does not attempt to predict future returns. Rather, the EMH states 144
that a security’s price incorporates possible projections of future happenings, based 
on  the  best  information  available  at  the  time.  The  EMH  merely  estimates  the 
performance of a stock. If the course of events veers the true value of the stock too far 
away  from  the  EMH  prediction,  even  then  the  deviation  does  not  challenge  the 
validity of EMH.  
What cannot be explained by theory is attributed to the unique psychology of the 
investors. Sociological explanations to financial behaviour manifests in presuming 
rational behaviour from market participants. Yet some decisions are made quickly, 
with no sufficient time or information.  Investors are also driven by their desires, 
emotions and fears. This is what led to the emergence of behavioural finance. 
Proponents of behavioural economics note that financial models often fail to predict 
outcomes  of  the  real  world.  Behavioural  insights  try  to  correctly  predict  some 
outcomes in cases where traditional models failed. 
In the recent months, several reports surfaced from renowned researchers claiming 
the  death  of  capitalism  and  free-markets  and  the  EMH.  “EMH,  is  the  financial 
equivalent of Monty Python’s dead parrot. No matter how much you point out that it 
is dead, the believers simply state that it is just resting. In part this is testament to the 
high degree of inertia that academic theories enjoy.” Montier (3) We also saw strong 
proponents of the theory  who discard Montier’s criticism as a straw  man  fallacy. 
Annunziata ‘’find[s] such assertions [-the death of EMH-] disingenuous, as well as 
internally  inconsistent—disingenuous,  because  the  EMH  has  been  challenged  for 
about thirty  years, and internally inconsistent because the crisis  has been brought 
about by behaviours that display a blatant lack of belief in the EMH.” Annunziata (1) 
Here is where a connection exists with the sociological approach. It would provide 
insight to a behavioural approach to financial analysis. Studying professionalisation 
projects, and how the sites of professionalisation are located opens doors to exploring 
the  very individuals that constitute a profession, as in the case of the accounting 
profession. These results are essential for someone studying the spirit of financial 
reporting, especially as a way for corporate managers to reveal, signal and disclose 
their performance.  
5 Conclusion 
Efficient Market Hypothesis was highly regarded in the finance sector as the driver of 
capital  markets.  Capitalism  and  free-markets  were  in  support  of  informationally 
efficient markets and in the era of telecommuniations the speed of information is 
unravelled. The crisis has unveiled a new line of thought, though not consistent with 
the above said. If there world financial markets were operating at such a level of 
transparency and such level efficiency, then how come the markets could not protect 
themselves from the enormous downfall that took place. The new line of prominent 
researchers are suggesting in less formal forums that the EMH is long dead. However, 
we maintain that although it will take time to understand what really happened and 
how is the EMH to be brought in connection with the crisis, the Efficient Markets is 145
the  best  model  we  currently  have  handy  that  describes  market  movement  and 
behaviour. Up to this point, investors rely on the same fundamental analyses that 
derive from the notion of efficiency. Our message in this paper is also supported by 
Annunziata, the EMH is valid, and the causes of the crisis should be looked for in the 
behaviour of investors not investing according to EMH. 
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